New challenges for equity in Uruguay by Filgueira, Fernando et al.
79C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 2  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 0
NEW CHALLENGES FOR EQUITY IN  URUGUAY  •  RUBEN KAZTMAN, FERNANDO F ILGUEIRA AND MAG DALENA FURTADO




From the early decades of the twentieth century onward,
the level of equity achieved in Uruguay, and the sophistica-
tion of its social welfare institutions, set the country apart
from the rest of Latin America. In the second half of the
century, this heritage of democracy and equity survived the
severe tests to which it was subjected without fracturing too
badly. The strength of the country’s sociocultural founda-
tions was convincingly demonstrated after the restoration
of democracy in 1985, when Uruguay succeeded in main-
taining the position it had traditionally held as the regional
leader in social development, this leadership being mani-
fested at this time in the country’s indices of poverty and
inequality as measured by income distribution, which were
low by the standards of other Latin American nations. The
authors contend that in the last fifteen years of the twentieth
century, Uruguay succeeded in coping with these challenges
by maintaining a good balance between the political, social
and economic aspects of development. They analyse the
subject by placing the position of Uruguay in a Latin Ameri-
can context. Using the same type of indicators, they then
describe how the country evolved in the closing fifteen years
of the twentieth century, after which they discuss some of
the most important processes underlying these trends in the
market, in households and in the State. Lastly, they offer
some reflections on the main challenges that the country
will have to address if it is to retain or improve the level of
national integration already achieved, on a basis of equity.
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I
Introduction
Although it is a widespread phenomenon, the economic
restructuring that globalization entails does not occur
in a social and political vacuum. On the contrary, it
takes place in societies that differ widely in terms of
their regulatory systems, institutional structures, legal
frameworks and welfare systems, which encapsulate
the most important features of their sociocultural
characteristics. Thus, while the processes that stem from
current development models are to be found in most
countries, the pace, sequence and substance of reforms,
and thus their social consequences, are different.
From the early decades of the twentieth century
onward, the level of equity achieved in Uruguay, and
the sophistication of its social welfare institutions, set
the country apart from the rest of Latin America. The
absence of significant ethnic and cultural divisions,
substantial primary product surpluses and early
democratic consolidation were some of the factors that
helped establish the sociocultural foundations which
were to give rise to this special position.
In the second half of the century, this heritage of
democracy and equity survived the severe tests to which
it was subjected without fracturing too badly. These
tests included prolonged economic stagnation, conflicts
between radically differing approaches to the
organization of society and the economy –which
imperilled political stability for a time– and a coup
d’état which put a military Government into power. The
strength of the country’s sociocultural foundations was
convincingly demonstrated after the restoration of
democracy in 1985, when Uruguay succeeded in
maintaining the position it had traditionally held as the
regional leader in social development, this leadership
being manifested at this time in the country’s indices
of poverty and inequality as measured by income
distribution, which were low by the standards of other
Latin American nations.
The conditions brought about by the return to
democracy undoubtedly made it easier to preserve this
heritage of equity, and to cope with the new challenges
that threatened its survival. The country had to find
its place in a globalized world, extend the boundaries
of competitiveness and adapt the workings of welfare
institutions to the demands of sustained growth within
these new parameters, and the main threats stemmed
from the consequences of these changes, which
affected different segments of society in different
ways.
In this section it is contended that, in the last fifteen
years of the twentieth century, the country managed to
cope with these challenges by maintaining an
appropriate balance between the political, social and
economic aspects of development, which has led some
specialists in these subjects to regard it as an example
of successful gradualism.1 In describing this process
as “successful” –in a regional context, of course– we
should not overlook the fact that, like all Latin American
countries, Uruguay is now being profoundly affected
by the serious problems that come with economic
restructuring, weak job creation and pressure to
deregulate the labour market. In truth, the consequences
of these problems are already manifesting themselves
as rents in the traditionally integrated social fabric of
the country, and in the warnings that are being sounded
about the difficulties involved in sustaining its style of
balanced growth.
1
 See the in-depth, comparative analysis of the Uruguayan case in
Filgueira and Morães (1999).
The authors wish to thank Carlos Filgueira, Juan Andrés Morães,
Juan Carlos Veronelli, Rafael Diez de Medina and Alvaro Fuentes
for their stimulating suggestions and for the comments they made
on a preliminary version of this paper.
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II
Uruguay in the Latin American context
Most of those studying equity-related problems agree
that Latin America has the most regressive distribution
of wealth of any region in the world. The figures for
Uruguay, however, set it clearly apart from its regional
context (table 1).
The values of the inequality and poverty indices
for 1990 and 1997 are lower in Uruguay than in the
other countries appearing in the table. Similarly, the
indicators showing how the social situation changed in
that period reveal that poverty and inequality were re-
duced to a greater extent there even than in Argentina
and Chile, which had higher rates of per capita gross
domestic product growth in those years than Uruguay
(33.2%, 53.3% and 27.2%, respectively).
In short, Uruguay showed a greater capacity to
mitigate the adverse social effects of the liberalization
and macroeconomic adjustment processes than other
countries in the region.
The good relative performance of Uruguay in the
sphere of social justice has its counterpart in the legiti-
macy that the country’s citizens attribute to its democ-
racy and institutions, as table 2 shows. The commit-
ment of the population to the democratic system means
that Uruguayan public opinion credits this system with
greater legitimacy, response capabilities, utility and
responsibility than is the case in most of the other coun-
tries in the region. For every one of the statements in-
cluded in this table that bespeak confidence in and sat-
isfaction with the workings of democracy, and in the
weighted sum of percentages of positive responses to
each question, Uruguayans show themselves to be more
TABLE 2
Latin America (eight countries): Views about democracy, 1995
(Percentage replying affirmatively)
Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
Democracy is preferable to any other form of government
Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in the country?
Democracy enables national problems to be solved
Elections in the country are clean
Senators and deputies are concerned about what people
like you think
The way you vote can make things different in future
Unweighted total
Source: Kaztman (1997), on the basis of data from Basañez, Lagos and Beltrán (1996).
82 48 54 57 58 58 86 64
53 31 34 24 31 47 59 38
59 51 51 52 39 71 63 53
78 26 82 52 39 64 83 19
19 16 24 24 28 29 38 16
75 53 56 53 62 75 77 52
366 225 301 223 228 344 406 242
TABLE 1































a Quotient between the average incomes of the richest 10% and
the poorest 40%.
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in agreement with and committed to the institutions of
democracy than the inhabitants of other countries in
the region.2
Social justice and adherence to democracy are
closely connected. The perception of social injustice
or of inequality of opportunities relative to other groups
in society tends to weaken the commitment of those
affected to the institutions that make these inequities
possible. In turn, the lack of trust in institutions makes
“the processes of aggregating the preferences of indi-
viduals more complex and uncertain and exacerbates
conflicts over the distribution of public resources. The
economic and social integration of the different groups
is more difficult as well, and the State machinery is
more likely to become subject to the influence of pres-
sure groups, corruption and inefficiency, all of which
helps to perpetuate inequality” (IDB, 1998). Figure 1
shows the correlation between the two phenomena.
III
Trends in poverty and inequality since
the restoration of democracy
1. Poverty
The general progress of the Uruguayan economy meant
that between 1986 and 1997 real average household
income increased by over 50%. This growth was ac-
companied by a significant reduction in poverty3 in
urban areas of the country (figure 2). From 1986 to
1998 the percentage of poor households fell from 37%
to 15.5%, while the percentage of indigent households
(those whose per capita incomes are insufficient to cover
the cost of a basic food basket) initially declined in the
early years of the period under consideration, before
stabilizing at around 1%.
Figure 3 shows the inverse relationship between
changes in national per capita income and poverty. In a
country where income distribution is not subject to
sudden changes, and where the level of concentration
is relatively low, it is not surprising that the fruits of
2
 The kind of democratic mindset that these responses reveal is the
result of cultural patterns that do not crystallize overnight. On the
contrary, it has to be nurtured over a long period, becoming
entrenched as a result of processes that usually extend over a number
of generations and that have profound inertial effects on the political
attitudes of citizens.
3
 The index of poverty used here is based on estimates of the cost
of the basic food basket produced by the Uruguayan National
Institute of Statistics, these being based on the results of the
Household Expenditure and Income Survey carried out in 1994-
1995. Although the tendency is generally the same, this index differs
in magnitude from the one used for comparative purposes in the
Social Panorama of Latin America (ECLAC, 1999), which was the
source for table 1.
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of National Institute
of Statistics (INE) standing household surveys.
FIGURE 2
Changes in the poverty level. Urban total, 1986-1998
(Percentages)
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FIGURE 1
Inequality and satisfaction with democracy.















Source: Produced by the author on the basis of ECLAC (1999) and
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growth are quickly reflected in falling poverty levels.
The curves of the graph also clearly reflect the “Te-
quila effect” of late 1994 and its inertial consequences,
which were subsequently compounded by those of the
crises affecting Russia and South-East Asia.
Apart from the ups and downs of the economy,
perhaps the most important single factor behind the fall
in poverty was the constitutional amendment passed
by the 1989 plebiscite. This amendment provided for
the benefits of old-age and other pensioners to be
indexed automatically to the average wage index. Since
around half of all urban households in Uruguay (49.6%
in 1998) have some income from pensions, the change
meant that a substantial proportion of poor households
containing old-age or other pensioners ceased to be
poor. Between 1989 and 1998, in fact, the percentage
of poor households containing one or more old-age or
other pensioners fell from 40.2% to 32.4% of all poor
households. To look at it from a different angle, between
1989 (the year of the plebiscite) and 1998, poverty in
urban households declined by 18.4%, while in
households containing an old-age pensioner the decline
was 32.6% (figure 4).
Family strategies also contributed to the reduction
of poverty, mainly through increasing participation by
married women in paid work. This mobilization of the
family labour force led to an increase in the proportion
of family members in the labour market (occupational
density) in households in the first five deciles (figure 5).
The opposite happened with higher-income households,
partly because the rise in pensions enabled households
containing pensioners to move up into the higher
deciles. Although higher occupational density mitigates
the effects of economic crises, it also has negative ef-
fects, particularly in poorer households. Given that these
account for a disproportionate share of the population’s
biological and social reproduction efforts, when mar-
ried women carry out paid work their ability to care for
and watch over their children is diminished. Further-
more, when children from such households join the
labour market at an early age their opportunities for
accumulating educational attainments are significantly
reduced (Filgueira, 1999).
Other households distanced themselves from the
threat of poverty by deciding to limit the size of their
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Reducción de la pobreza Variación del ingreso per cápita de los hogares
FIGURE 3
Relationship between growth and poverty. Urban total,
1986-1998
(Percentages)
edu tion in poverty Change in per capita househol  income
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of National Institute













Montevideo Interior Urbano Total Urbano
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FIGURE 4
Percentage of all poor households containing poor
old-age pensioners, 1989, 1994 and 1998
(Percentages)
Montevid o Urban interi r Urban total
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of National Institute
of Statistics (INE) standing household surveys.
FIGURE 5
Changes in occupational density. Urban total, 1986-1998
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of National Institute
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in urban areas fell from 2.89 to 2.60 per woman. Trends
of this nature generally reflect an increase in the amount
of human capital vested in women and their willingness
to make use of it by improving their opportunities in
the labour market. In this case, though, the decline in
fertility was also seen among categories of women that
were more likely to fall into poverty. Fertility rates for
those without schooling fell from 3.92 to 2.88, while
for those with incomplete primary education they fell
from 4.33 to 4.24.4 To sum up, greater participation by
married women in the workforce and a decline in the
number of children helped to reduce poverty as
measured by per capita household incomes.
In the last fifteen years of the twentieth century,
changes in the proportion of households that were poor
were accompanied by significant progress in satisfying
certain basic needs. Although they do not cover the
whole period, the data given in figure 6 show that
between 1991 and 1998 major advances were made in
respect of access to electricity, piped drinking water in
homes, medical cover and better housing conditions.
2. Inequality5
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, the
decline in poverty and the improvement in living
conditions that occurred over the last fifteen years of the
twentieth century could have arisen under different income
distribution scenarios. In Uruguay, this distribution
remained virtually unchanged throughout the period
(figure 7). In fact, the Gini index of per capita income
distribution (with rental value) between households6
fluctuated around 0.41, with a slight tendency to rise,









Agua 9.4 8.9 7.6 6.8 6.5 5.4 5.3 5.4
Cob. Médica 12.1 11.7 11.0 10.5 11.1 10.0 10.2 8.8
Viv. Precaria 4.0 3.0 2.7 3.3 2.1 2.3 1.7 1.9
Electricidad 2.0 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
FIGURE 6
Changes in some critical deficiency levels.









Source: Produced by the Uruguayan Human Development Report
(UNDP, in the press) on the basis of data from National Institute of
Statistics (INE) standing household surveys.
FIGURE 7
Inequality in Uruguay, 1986-1998
(Gini coefficient)
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of National Institute
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4
 See National Institute for Women and the Family (in the press).
5
 The coefficient of inequality used (Gini) produces different values and
trends from the one employed in the Social Panorama of Latin America
(ECLAC, 1999). The latter was constructed using a methodology that
sought to maximize the reliability of the results in order to establish the
relative positions of the countries in the aspect under consideration,
which meant that the criteria followed had to take account of the
limitations of national information sources. The results set forth in this
section agree with those of other studies carried out for Uruguay (see
Vigorito, 1999, p. 259, table 2B).
6
 Per capita household income was calculated by adding together the
different types of income received by households in the form of
remuneration from work and capital, pensions, benefits and transfers
and an imputed rental value for owner-occupied housing. Domestic
servants living in households were not deemed to be members of them
for the purposes of these calculations.
7
 The index values for the 1990s are not statistically different from
those of the 1980s, except in 1998. In that year, the statistical confidence
interval of the estimate, at 95%, does not overlap with those for the 1980s.
TABLE 3
Urban areas of Uruguay: Income share of household
quintiles ranked by per capita income. 1986-1998
(Percentages)
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
1986 5.6 10.4 15.0 21.8 47.3
1987 5.9 10.6 15.2 21.9 46.4
1988 6.0 10.5 14.9 21.4 47.2
1989 5.8 10.5 14.9 21.5 47.3
1990 5.8 10.4 14.9 21.5 47.5
1991 5.7 10.3 14.8 21.4 47.7
1992 5.5 10.2 14.8 21.4 48.1
1993 5.8 10.7 15.3 22.0 46.1
1994 5.6 10.3 14.9 21.8 47.4
1995 5.4 10.2 14.9 22.0 47.5
1996 5.4 10.2 14.8 21.9 47.7
1997 5.4 10.1 14.8 21.7 48.0
1998 5.2 9.9 14.7 21.9 48.4
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of National Institute
of Statistics (INE) standing household surveys.
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A similar pattern is seen when, instead of a
synthetic measure like the Gini index being used,
changes  in  the  income shares  rece ived  by
households in each of the five per capita income
quintiles are tracked over the period. Thus, while
the movements seen over the entirety of the period
1986-1998 are small, it transpires that the share of
the 40% of urban households with the lowest incomes
declined, while that of the richest 20% of households
rose (table 3).
IV
Factors determining trends in income distribution
1. Initial considerations
The modest extent of the changes in the income
distribution indices may be misleading, as it might suggest
that inequality levels are relatively unaffected both by the
type of growth and by the major economic and social
processes affecting societies.8 The correct interpretation
is quite different. Societies are constantly exposed to forces
that shape their structures in more or less equitable ways,
and that consequently affect different social categories in
different directions and to differing degrees. The categories
that are affected adversely seek to counteract these effects
using whatever individual and collective resources they
can mobilize.
When this view is taken, indicators of income
distribution (and of wealth, when adequate information
is available) are interpreted rather as the outcome of a
complex web of forces set in train by the market on the
one hand and by individuals, households and collective
actors on the other. As we shall see later on, changes in
the market lead to shifts in the profitability of the
different factors of production, and thus affect both
average incomes and the distribution of income between
the different sources from which it derives.
Individuals react to changes in the market by
opting, insofar as the opportunities available to them
allow, for different courses of action. Within their
households, they are involved in decisions about the
number of children to have, whether or not to keep them
in the educational system when to do so begins to
become incompatible with income needs, whether
people should enter or leave the household, and with
what frequency and level of commitment each member
of working age should participate in the labour market.
On the institutional level, meanwhile, collective actors
struggle among themselves to have a greater say in the
way policy instruments are designed and implemented,
using their social, political and economic resources to
increase or preserve their share in the fruits of growth,
or to minimize the portion of costs they bear at times
of crisis. All these forces act beneath the surface,
shaping the distribution of income and wealth in society.
We shall now take a more synthetic approach to
exploring some of the factors that might have affected
the distribution of income in Uruguay over the last
fifteen years of the second millennium.
2. Determining factors
a) Liberalization, fiscal adjustment and external
upheavals
Although it is still very early to claim that the new de-
velopment styles have affected income distribution,
some authors have identified an empirical association
between the structural reform processes that these styles
entail and an increase in inequality (Altimir, 1997).9
Any attempt to apply this hypothesis to Uruguay would
have to take into account the particular characteristics
of its structural reform process, including among other
things the absence of any significant privatizations and
the financial liberalization that was carried out as early
as the 1970s.
In any event, between 1985 and 1998 Uruguay
pushed ahead vigorously with the external liberalization
process and with measures to control the budget deficit.
Tariff barriers were lowered, so that the average tariff
8
 Li, Squire and Zou (1998) examined income distribution trends
in 45 countries for which there was good quality information
covering long periods. They found that most of them (29) did not
show discernible tendencies in either direction, while the rest
divided equally between rising inequality and falling inequality.
9
 Altimir reached this finding after analysing five countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico.
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fell from 40.7% to 12.8%10 (UNCTAD/ECLAC, 1998). In
that same period, the overall budget deficit fell from
6.3% to 1.0% of gross domestic product (President of
the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Planning and Budget
Office, 1999) and inflation fell from around 70% to
some 10%.
Both external liberalization and State reform
policies altered the composition of employment. In
many of the region’s countries, globalization of the
economy led to a decline in the relative weight of
industry as an employer and as a contributor to national
output. In Uruguay, where these processes took place
in the period under consideration, the proportion of the
total workforce accounted for by industrial workers fell
from 20.5% in 1986 to 16.3% in 1998. In other words,
almost a fifth of all workers in industry switched to
services or went to swell the unemployment rate.
The fiscal adjustment was accompanied by a
shrinking of the State machinery. Of thirteen countries
for which comparative information is available for the
period running from the beginning of the 1980s to the
end of the 1990s, twelve, including Uruguay, saw a
decline in the percentage of workers in public-sector
jobs (ECLAC, 1999). In this period, the proportion of
workers employed by the public sector fell from around
a quarter of the urban labour force to around a sixth,
thus declining by around 30% in terms of relative weight.
These changes could not but affect the distribu-
tion of income among households. In point of fact, until
the effects of the Mexican crisis began to be felt, aver-
age household income had grown continuously over
the period (box 1).
If the consequences for social equity of the trade
liberalization and fiscal adjustment processes are to be
interpreted correctly, they need to be tracked by
analysing changes in the structures through which these
two phenomena operate, such as the recomposition of
different income sources, shifts in the labour market
and State policy instruments that are activated to coun-
teract any regressive effects these processes might have.
Box 1
Greater economic openness magnified the effects of the Mexican crisis of late 1994, which resulted in increased
unemployment and poverty. Having stood at around 9% from 1986 to 1994, unemployment rates in Uruguay
rose to levels of between 11% and 13% as a result of the “Tequila effect”. The consequences of such economic
crises have a tendency to linger on, in part because businesses become more cautious about entering into
contractual arrangements with new workers –an attitude that persists even into periods of economic recovery–
and more willing to replace labour with machinery. They can also result in higher school drop-out rates, as
family members turn to the labour market to make good the income lost by some adult members, or in early
retirement by people who are put out of work at an age when their prospects of re-entering the market are very
poor. Generally speaking, situations of crisis force the poor to take decisions that have medium- and long-
term implications for the ability of household members to accumulate the assets they need for their well-
being.
In evaluating the impact of the Mexican crisis, it has to be appreciated that the differences between the
size of the Uruguayan economy and those of its two main partners in Mercosur meant that the indirect
repercussions of the “Tequila effect” on Argentina and Brazil were at least as important as its direct effects on
Uruguay. This is why that crisis upset the stability of the relatively low indices of inequality and poverty that
characterized the Uruguayan situation in the last fifteen years of the twentieth century. As was often pointed
out in the analyses carried out during the recessionary decade of the 1980s, poorer households are the first to
be affected in periods of recession and the last to benefit from economic upturns, and this leads to asynchrony
between the rates at which poverty rises and falls as the vicissitudes of growth dictate. Any reading of the
poverty and inequality data for the closing years of the twentieth century also has to take account of the
cumulative effects of crises subsequent to the Mexican one (Russia, South-East Asia and Brazil).
10
 From January 1998 the tariff was raised by three points following
an agreement among the Mercosur countries prior to the devaluation
carried out by Brazil, the country which requested this increase.
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b) Changes in income sources
Between 1986 and 1997, the country experienced changes
in the relative weight of the different sources from which
people received income. The average income from old-
age and other pensions grew throughout the period.
Average income from capital rose up until 1992 and then
fell from that year to 1997 (table 4). Lastly, average earnings
rose until 1994, but did so more slowly than the other two
sources, after which they fell, but again to a lesser extent
than income from capital.
Meanwhile, changes in income distribution
differed depending on the sources that people obtained
their income from. The data show a tendency for the
distribution of income to shift in favour of workers and,
in the 1990s, of pension holders as well, while the
income deriving from possession of capital decreased
in relative terms (table 4).
Stability in the distribution of total income among
recipients does not necessarily entail a corresponding
stability in inequality trends among households, since
these ultimately depend on the way individuals are
combined in those households.
Some studies have looked at the effect of changes
in income sources on total inequality. Thus, Vigorito
(1999) analysed the contribution of each source to the
change in inequality between 1986 and 1997 by
breaking down Theil’s entropy index 1,11 which
remained virtually unchanged (it rose to 32.85 in 1986
and 33.05 in 1997). The author referred to found that
the influence of wages, old-age and other pensions and
the incomes of own-account workers was in the
direction of greater inequality over that period, while
employers’ incomes moved in a direction that reduced
concentration, virtually cancelling out the changes in
the other sources (table 5).
These results make it clear that the relative weight
of the different income sources in Uruguay did not
remain unchanged, and that the overall impact on
inequality of these sources over time masks changes
that cancel one another out.
It would be useful to know what influence the
different sources have on overall inequality. Setting out
from a breakdown of entropy index 0, Bucheli and
Furtado (in the press) quantify the extent to which these
11
 To do this she used Shorrocks’ breakdown rule (1982 and 1983)
as adopted by Jenkins (1995) and Foster and Sen (1997) and applied
it to the distribution of total household income (excluding rental
value) between households.
TABLE 4
Urban areas of Uruguay: Average income and distribution among recipients.
by income source. 1986-1998
Average income of recipientsa Gini index of recipients
Workb Pensions Capitalc Total Work Pensions Capital Total
1986 28.4 12.9 47.4 27.9 0.426 0.409 0.601 0.475
1987 31.8 14.7 56.6 31.5 0.413 0.408 0.608 0.468
1988 34.3 17.3 65.8 34.9 0.413 0.445 0.581 0.476
1989 36.0 16.2 63.8 35.2 0.416 0.430 0.581 0.475
1990 34.3 16.7 64.7 34.0 0.415 0.450 0.600 0.479
1991 36.5 18.0 68.9 36.5 0.426 0.427 0.604 0.480
1992 38.4 20.5 75.6 38.6 0.441 0.426 0.598 0.483
1993 39.2 22.0 68.3 38.6 0.435 0.425 0.544 0.466
1994 41.1 22.9 74.9 40.8 0.449 0.432 0.563 0.480
1995 39.3 22.3 66.3 38.6 0.455 0.434 0.548 0.479
1996 39.1 23.1 65.8 38.1 0.457 0.433 0.543 0.476
1997 38.1 23.9 68.2 38.0 0.458 0.434 0.541 0.476
1998 40.8 25.7 82.0 41.8 0.453 0.448 0.552 0.479
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of National Institute of Statistics (INE) standing household surveys.
a Average incomes per recipient are expressed in December 1995 prices.
b Earnings include private-sector and public-sector wages and the earnings of own-account workers with or without premises.
c Income from capital includes rents, interest and employers’ income (profits and remuneration).
d In 1998 there were changes to the way the sample for the standing household survey was taken (updating of the sample framework,
changes to the replacement criteria and removal of towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants) and these may have led to jumps in the levels
of some variables which have not yet been analysed.
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sources account for developments in income
distribution.12 It was found that the inequality
component attributable to differences between groups
of recipients rose from 9.4% in 1986 to 11.7% in 1992,
which means that the slight increase in inequality
between 1986 and 1992 was due essentially to
increasing income disparities between people whose
income came from different sources. In fact, while all
incomes increased in this subperiod, the rise in incomes
deriving from the possession of capital was so great
that the top end of the distribution shot up.
Subsequently, from 1992 to 1997, the differences
between people receiving incomes from different
sources tended to narrow (table 4). The average income
of old-age and other pensioners –which stood at the
lowest levels– rose in those years by 16.6%, while at
the other extreme the income generated by capital fell
by 9.8%. Average earnings stayed at intermediate levels.
Consequently, the small increase in overall inequality
from 1992 onward can be explained by factors
unconnected with changes in income sources, since the
component of inequality between groups fell (in 1997
it accounted for just 6.6% of inequality) and dispersion
within groups increased.
c) Changes in the profitability of education
The analysis of changes in sources showed that the
greatest contribution to income concentration was made
by wages, and that from 1992 onward the dispersion
between recipients of work income increased.
This led on to an examination of changes in the
labour market. It was found that the income of
households whose heads had tertiary education grew
by more than that of households whose heads had only
primary education. This development, affecting groups
at the top and bottom of the distribution scale, was a
force for concentration, and would account for the slight
increase in inequality towards the end of the period
studied (Bucheli and Furtado, in the press).
In fact, a number of studies on Uruguay show not
only that education is the factor that has the greatest
influence on income inequality among households,13
but also that this influence increased in the 1990s. The
findings of these studies, which give different values
depending on the index and classification used, are set
out in table 6.
These results are supported by wage equations
calculated for private-sector workers in Uruguay, ac-
cording to which the marginal profitability of the higher
levels of education rose in the late 1990s, increasing
the wage differences between workers with different
levels of education (Bucheli and Furtado, 2000).
d) Transfers
As was noted in point b), changes in the amount of
old-age and other pensions have also contributed to the
concentration of income. A number of studies show
that indexation of these basically resulted in income
recipients moving up from “middle sectors to higher
ones, and in changes to the demographic composition
of the lower deciles” (Vigorito, 1997, p. 17; Bucheli
and Rossi, 1994). In this respect, it should be noted
that average incomes from old-age and other pensions
grew by more than those from any other source of
income in the period, and that the Gini index for the
internal distribution of income of this type also rose in
the 1990s (table 4).
The concentration of old-age and other pensions
tended to increase, by contrast with what happened in
TABLE 5
Urban areas of Uruguay: Contribution of the different
income sources to changes in income concentration,
1986-1997









 The two usual components are distinguished: the component of
inequality attributable to the differences between groups and the
component of inequality attributable to the differences within
groups. This breakdown makes it possible to measure the
explanatory power of a classification: the greater the percentage
contribution of the differences between groups, the more powerful
will be the classification arrived at to explain total inequality. The
classification had ten groups made up of people in households where
more than 65% of household income came from a clearly identified
source –possession of capital, old-age and other pensions and four
occupational categories– and, in the remaining cases, from a
combination of different sources.
13
 Several works show that the influence of other variables is
considerably less: the age of heads of household, and whether or
not they are working, each account for less than 5% of total
inequality, while region and household structure account for around
10% (Machado and Reggio, 1999 and Vigorito, 1999).
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the case of other State transfers, such as social
allowances and benefits (table 7). Since their share of
total government transfers to urban households rose
from 74.8% to 92.4% in the period 1988-1998, the net
result of these transfers was regressive. This was the
case despite major changes in some of the instruments
involved, such as family allowances which, while they
had a clear equalizing effect, did not suffice to offset
the additional concentration produced by pensions, so
that the effort made to target social allowances and
benefits was not enough to prevent a decline in the portion
of transfers reaching the poorest (ECLAC, 1998).14
e) Household strategies
As was mentioned earlier, it we are to move from look-
ing at the way income is distributed among individual
recipients to the way it is distributed among households,
we need to consider how individuals are combined in
those households. Although in practice income tends
to be distributed among households in much the same
way as it is among individuals, this is not always so.
Households have considerable room for manoeuvre
in mitigating the effects of cuts in the incomes of their
main providers: they can raise their incomes by
mobilizing the labour force at their disposal and
combining different sources of income, they can make
decisions about family size by changing their plans
about the number of children to have or delaying
pregnancies, and they can join forces with other family
members in order to raise their average income.
In accordance with a general tendency in Latin
America, the main strategy used by lower-income
Uruguayan households was to increase their occupational
density (figure 4) by bringing married women into the
labour market (ECLAC, 1998 and 1999). Vigorito (1999)
has demonstrated that increased participation by women
in the labour market led to a rise in their contribution to
household income (from 12% in 1986 to 15.9% in 1997),
while their contribution to inequality was greater, as their
incomes from all sources showed a higher degree of
dispersion than was the case with men.
14
 Although the rise in the value of retirement and other pensions
had a regressive effect, any assessment of the overall effect of the
changes on the well-being of the population needs to take account
of the contribution these made, against the background of an in-
creasingly uncertain labour market, to the stability of household
incomes. This increased stability does not just benefit pensioners
and those who are not pensioners but live with one or more of
them, but can also have a significant effect in relieving people’s
concerns about their parents’ subsistence, even when they do not
live in the same household as them.
TABLE 6
Urban areas of Uruguay: Changes in the component of
inequality between groups according to different




Index of entropy 0 18.2 20.5 21.3
Vigoritob
Index of entropy 0 19.2 18.5 24.4
Index of entropy 1 21.5 19.1 26.6
Machado and Reggioc
Index of entropy 0 24.1 26.4
Index of entropy 1 25.5 27.6
Source: Bucheli and Furtado (in the press), Vigorito (1999) and
Machado and Reggio (1999).
a The classification goes by the educational level of heads of
household (0 to 6, 7 to 12, 13 or more years of education) for
people in households where more than 65% of income is from
work; for those dependent on capital or a combination of
sources, openings by educational level were not carried out.
The degree of inequality was measured by the distribution of
per capita income (without rental value) between individuals.
b The classification distinguished between households according
to the educational level of their heads: first stage of secondary,
second stage of secondary, UTU (Universidad del Trabajo del
Uruguay), university, others.
c The classification distinguished between incomplete primary
education, complete primary, incomplete secondary, complete
secondary, UTU, tertiary, others. Inequality was measured by
equivalent income distribution between households (with rental
value).
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V
The political and institutional framework
and public policies
1. How reform is implemented: gradualism and
sequences of reform that do not result in con-
centration
One of the most important aspects of the political and
social changes introduced in Uruguay has been their
incremental and eclectic nature.15 If the position of
Uruguay is considered in its regional context, this
pattern of development, viewed over the long term,
seems to have had more virtues than defects. We say
“seems to have had” because the arguments that follow
cannot easily be subjected to rigorous empirical tests,
and contain a high degree of speculation.
TABLE 7
Urban areas of Uruguay: Composition and distribution of government transfers
by per capita income quintiles, 1988, 1991 and 1998
(Percentages)
Pensions Social allowances Benefits Total transfers
1988
Composition 74.8 4.4 20.8 100.0
Distribution
Quintile 1 8.6 29.5 16.7 11.2
Quintile 2 15.1 25.3 17.4 16.0
Quintile 3 18.2 19.5 18.2 18.3
Quintile 4 21.6 14.5 20.1 21.0
Quintile 5 36.4 11.2 27.6 33.5
Quintile 6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991
Composition 89.1 3.5 7.4 100.0
Distribution
Quintile 1 8.9 29.2 19.3 10.4
Quintile 2 14.9 21.5 16.3 15.2
Quintile 3 19.1 20.7 16.0 18.9
Quintile 4 22.7 14.5 13.0 21.7
Quintile 5 34.4 14.0 35.4 33.7
Quintile 6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1998
Composition 92.4 0.9 6.8 100.0
Distribution
Quintile 1 6.2 37.7 23.2 7.7
Quintile 2 12.5 26.6 23.4 13.3
Quintile 3 17.0 17.2 22.4 17.4
Quintile 4 23.1 13.1 16.1 22.6
Quintile 5 41.1 5.4 15.0 39.1
Quintile 6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Produced by the author on the basis of data from National Institute of Statistics (INE) standing household surveys.
15
 Eclectic in that on many occasions they have departed from the
orthodox adjustment model, or what has come to be known as the
Washington Consensus.
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Like the other countries in the region, Uruguay had
to cope with the obsolescence of an old inward-looking,
State-led development model. At the same time, the
country faced the difficult task of converting to an
export-oriented model in which the market plays a
central role in the allocation of resources, entailing
reforms in at least five key areas: financial liberalization,
trade liberalization, fiscal reform, privatization and
reform of the State machinery, and labour market
deregulation.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has
devised an index to measure progress with these five
areas of reform in Latin America, the values it
produces being used to estimate the relative speed with
which they are being applied in each country (IDB,
1997). In the case of Uruguay, the data from this index
(figure 8) record a difference of 18% between the
beginning and end of the period 1985-1995 in the
country’s scores for progress in structural policies.
This small difference –the lowest of any of the
countries for which information is available, including
those such as Chile and Colombia which started off
in 1985 with scores similar to Uruguay’s– make the
country an example of gradualism in the region (IDB,
1997, appendix 5).
In addition to the reform areas taken by IDB, social
reform also needs to be considered. The approach taken
by Uruguay in this area has also been gradualist and,
as will be seen later on, particularly eclectic.
The gradualism characterizing Uruguay has at least
two essential merits: it helps protect the interests of
subordinate groups, and it bolsters democracy. In the
first case, this is because the basic resources of the least
powerful sectors –mass mobilization and organization–
are more effective in democratic negotiations and are
weakened when shock policies or sudden reforms are
applied.
The second merit of gradualism is that it strengthens
and reaffirms the power of democratic mechanisms to take
difficult decisions about development models and
problems that are ultimately to do with distribution. Or to
look at it from the negative side: shock policies tend to
inhibit the development or creation of a democratic culture
in which the legitimacy of decisions derives from the way
they are taken, and not from their results.
The sequence of reforms in the country also has
its virtues. To put it in a highly condensed form, it may
be said that the essential role of the reforms is to “ex-
pose to the blast of competition” actors who previously
operated in a “protected and regulated environment”.
Depending on the reform that is applied, certain actors
will be more exposed to this “blast” than others. By
way of example: whereas lower tariffs force protected
companies (i.e., capital) to confront international com-
petition, labour market deregulation increases compe-
tition for labour rather than capital. Consequently, the
sequence of reform determines the scope those affected
have for transferring costs to other actors. Another example:
if tariff reforms and labour market deregulation take
place at the same time, companies can transfer a large
part of their costs to wage earners by reducing wages
and benefits and reducing staff levels at little cost to
themselves.
The sequence of reforms in Uruguay was ideal in
terms of distribution. Financial, fiscal and foreign trade
reforms were the first to be carried out. With the
exception of fiscal reform, whose effect on companies
and workers is unclear, the other two primarily affect
capital, forcing it to absorb part of the restructuring
costs of the development model. If it is considered that
the labour market and social reforms were the last to
be applied, and that privatization was a failure, the
reform sequence looks like a particularly progressive
one. It was wage earners and sectors depending on the
State that were the last to be deprived of protection of
various kinds, and this reduced the scope of those
controlling capital to transfer costs to them. The
information provided over the course of this section
seems to be consistent with these ideas. As was pointed
out earlier, it was in respect of income from capital
that concentration declined most over the period, since
capital now has to operate in a common competitive
environment, whereas previously it extracted its
advantages and profit from stratified protection
regimes.
FIGURE 8
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2. The substance of reform: eclecticism and
limits on the market
Although this is another area where argument does not
easily lend itself to empirical proof, it seems reasonable
to say that the preservation of equity in Uruguay was
contributed to by political decisions relating not just to
the pace and sequence of the reforms, but to their
substance as well.
In a series of studies aiming to achieve a better
understanding of the roles that have been played by
democracy, as a system that enables the population to
have a voice and a vote in struggles over distribution,
and by the State, acting as the guarantor and shield of
the weakest to improve the distribution of prosperity,
Fernando Filgueira has carried out an exhaustive
analysis of the social and political mechanisms
mobilized, and the specific characteristics of the sectors
and the strategies of the groups involved, at different
stages of reform and of efforts to privatize public-sector
companies in Uruguay.16
These analyses show that the socio-political
structure of Uruguay has proved reluctant to adopt the
kind of adjustment that has been applied in the region.
The following observations may be made:
i) In the period under consideration, most public-
sector enterprises and services stayed in the public
sphere, except in the area affected by social security
reform. Even where this reform is concerned, while
it resulted in a system that was clearly different
from the old one, it is quite dissimilar to other social
security models such as that of Chile, in that it has
remained under State control and committed to
distributive ends that do not feature so prominently
in other instances of reform.
ii) The country achieved a large reduction in the
budget deficit, along with rising figures for public
social spending (figure 9). A different course of
action, involving a structural adjustment process
that tends to reduce such spending, appears to have
come up against numerous difficulties in the last
fifteen years of the twentieth century. The particular
path taken by Uruguay has been strongly upheld
by a political process whose negotiating and
consensus-seeking systems tend to signal that a
great many balances need to be struck if
governments are to carry through the set of reforms
on their agenda. Above all, there is a need to
maintain high levels of spending on those public
policies that have been crucial to the shaping and
development of society and that have been largely
responsible for the progress made by the country
in terms of social equity.
iii) No formal changes were made to the way the
labour market operated, but there were substantial
de facto changes which made employment less
secure. More important still were changes to
collective bargaining methods, which underwent
substantial decentralization.
iv) There was strong resistance to the dismantling of
the education system. The reform carried out in
this system differed greatly from market-oriented
models, being decidedly statist, universalist and
strongly redistributive.
The continued existence of public goods that follows
from what has been said in the four paragraphs above
preserved the conditions that have traditionally con-
tributed to the ability of Uruguayan citizens to make
their “voice” heard clearly and often. This acts as a
corrective mechanism, inhibiting the use of market
options as a “way out”.17
3. The socio-political keys to an incremental and
eclectic approach to reform
As was noted earlier on, the peculiar characteristics of
Uruguay in the context of Latin America manifested
themselves during the reform process as a greater ability
to mitigate the negative consequences of the new growth
style, mainly by applying reforms selectively and
controlling the pace and thoroughness with which they
16
 See Filgueira and Morães (1999), Filgueira and Papadópulos
(1997) and Filgueira and Filgueira (1998).
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were introduced. We shall now briefly consider what
are the central characteristics of Uruguayan social and
political organization that enable us to understand both
the pace and the substance of the country’s structural
reforms.
Despite the major economic and social changes that
the country underwent between 1970 and 1985, at the
end of this period the key actors that had helped shape the
old model, and that to a large extent had benefited from it,
still had their place in the social structure of Uruguay. In
1985, the unions whose members were urban workers in
domestic industries, the protected industries themselves,
old-age and other pensioners covered by the social welfare
system and the large group constituted by civil servants
were still the main actors in the country’s distributive
struggles. To implement any major change, it was
necessary to negotiate, synthesize and incorporate the
interests of these actors in the context of a restored
democracy. This is perhaps one of the most crucial aspects
differentiating Uruguay from, for example, Chile. In the
latter country, the bulk of the structural changes were
implemented under a dictatorial regime, and the socio-
political system with which the restored democracy had
to deal retained few of the actors and characteristics of the
old development model. In Uruguay, by contrast, the
survival of the old system, and its transition to democratic
conditions, meant that any losers from the structural
transformation could negotiate the costs they would have
to pay and the time they would have to do it in.
To this old social structure, which had to be
reckoned with when the costs and benefits of
transforming the development model came to be
negotiated, had to be added the political structure
needed for the demands of actors to be translated into
concrete policies.
Politically, Uruguay had and has the most highly
institutionalized democratic process of any country in
Latin America, owing to two prominent features of its
political dynamic: a long-established and highly
institutionalized party system, and a deep-rooted
political culture of consensus-building. These two
factors have had a range of effects on the political
process, in which negotiations between parties and the
numerous ties that these have with different agents in
civil society have given a pluralistic form to dealings
between decision-making agents.
On the one hand, these two factors have shaped a
particular kind of relationship between those involved
with the technical side of policy-making and the party
elites, as a result of which, and by contrast with other
countries in Latin America, the links between technical
and political actors have always been channelled
completely through the intermediary of solid political
parties. On the other hand, the Uruguayan party system
has always been able to deal with demands expressed
as general interests in the provision of public goods, or
as private interests, chiefly in the way it responds to
corporate pressure from the unionized workforce and
from industrialists.
In the long term, the strong political intermediation
to which technical and specialist disciplines are subject,
and the arbitration capabilities evinced by the parties in
their system of responses to private and general demands,
have shaped a democratic system characterized by
permanent negotiation between political and social
actors.18 Consequently, what is surprising about the
Uruguayan process in the long term is its ability to bring
about major transformations in a context of democracy
and pluralism (O’Donnell, 1993). In addition, a range of
characteristics in the institutional framework and the
political system have combined with this tradition of
gradualism to give the substance of the reforms a stamp
that, in economic terms, is markedly anti-liberal, so that
while the role of the State as an allocator of resources has
been moderated, in no case has it been replaced by a pure
market system. It should be emphasized that this situation
has arisen in an international and domestic context which
is strongly conducive to the adoption of a purely orthodox
model, but that the social and political structures have
played an effective intermediary role in guiding these
pressures.
The Uruguayan experience with structural reform
shows that the degree to which these reforms are
introduced, and the models used to do so, rather than
international pressure and changes to production
systems, are what determine the tendency of countries
to implement neoliberal reform processes and withdraw
the protection of the State. In other words, the likelihood
of these adjustment and transformation models being
applied is directly proportional to the degree of socio-
political exclusion traditionally affecting the poorer
sections of society. In Uruguay, we have a State
penetrated throughout by party structures, a party
18
 Of course, the long-term characteristics described here have been
distorted by temporary situations of great impact. Thus, the years
of authoritarian rule (1973-1984) were a time when citizens expe-
rienced very marked political and social exclusion. This, however,
did not sharply reverse the prevailing relationship between techni-
cians and policy, which shows that the structure was stronger than
the circumstances. Nor could authoritarian rule reverse the gradu-
alist tradition, despite its discretionary power to implement reforms.
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system that is accessible to the poorer sections of the
population, and a society that has received protection
and benefits from the State on a generous scale.
Although, as this article has stressed, Uruguay has made
major changes to its development model and to the role
the State plays in this model, the costs and benefits of
these changes have been distributed far less inequitably
than in the case of other Latin American countries.
Among the social and political characteristics that
the country displays, there is a political and social cul-
ture rooted in a past that has produced a country with-
out major social, political, ethnic or even economic
distances: a country of proximities, as Real de Azúa
would put it. Its heritage includes reserves of altruism
and low tolerance to extreme inequalities, attributes
without which the social and political structure of
Uruguay would not have been in a position to main-
tain, in an international context of increasing concen-
tration and inequality, the essential identities of a soci-
ety whose ideal for itself is equality and integration.
VI
Final reflections. The challenges to Uruguayan
equity in the third millennium
Given the need for continuous readjustment in the face
of the upheavals unleashed by globalization, everything
seems to indicate that a great deal of time will be needed
for national economies to settle down to a viable, stable
state. As was mentioned in the introduction, experts on
the subject agree that under the new conditions the main
problems will revolve around the weakness of job
creation and the pressure exerted by the forces that are
acting to roll back the gains made in the labour market.
Uruguay is not proof against the socially destabilizing
tendencies that are being unleashed in this way, and
this undoubtedly raises major new challenges for the
maintenance of equity.19 Indeed, given that the
measures that will have to be designed and implemented
will be at the core of the struggle over distribution,
efforts to address the new problems of employment will
involve entering the “hardest” areas of social policy
(Kaztman and Gerstenfeld, 1990). The resultant need
to couple together very divergent interests will test the
reserves of solidarity of Uruguayan society, as well as
the capacity of its institutions to generate around these
issues the wide base of political support that will
undoubtedly be needed.
Uruguay’s preparedness for coping with these
challenges and for retaining its position of leadership
in the region where social development is concerned
will depend on the capacities of the country’s people
and the efficiency and effectiveness of its institutions,
the threshold beyond which its citizens will not tolerate
inequality and their willingness to support the needful
corrections when inequality exceeds the thresholds of
tolerance. It may be said that the historical legacy of
social justice and democracy in Uruguay, crystallized
in the country’s basic structures (market, property, State,
etc.), has shaped the living conditions and attitudes of
its people, making them intolerant of inequality and
endowing them with considerable reserves of altruism
and solidarity.20 The results of these values in practice
are seen in the support given to the political and
institutional mechanisms that come to the defence of
the weakest.21
Attitudes of solidarity are also sustained, at the
least, by an ability to empathize which enables people19 Among the greatest of the influences for concentration associated
with globalization is the improved profitability of factors that can
cross national boundaries, such as capital and highly qualified
human resources. Big companies, and transnationals in particular,
which make more intensive use of these factors, will show a growing
ability to take advantages of the economies of scale generated by
globalization both in trade and in the financing of production
activities. In turn, greater scope for relocating production will
undermine workers’ negotiating positions and make their incomes
more unstable by increasing the vulnerability of these to fluctuations
in demand.
20
 The idea of a reserve of altruism is discussed in Paci (1998).
21
 Another set of motivations that may give rise to this support
springs not from the aversion to inequality, but from fear of the
externalities of social inequity: political instability, weakening of
the legitimacy of institutions and the consequent difficulty of mo-
bilizing public opinion in support of plans for change, in the face
of public insecurity, etc.
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to place themselves in the situation of others and un-
derstand how serious or otherwise their problems are,
and by a feeling of moral obligation which makes those
who possess it act for the benefit of others.
These feelings, abilities and attitudes are refreshed
and restored daily through informal, face-to-face
contact between people of different social origins in
situations that are not constrained by the hierarchies
inherent in market relationships. The more frequent and
intense the contacts, the stronger the feelings will be.
By contrast, all processes that tend to reduce the
opportunities for informal contacts between the social
classes tend to weaken feelings of solidarity and raise
the threshold of tolerance for inequality.
The literature dealing with these issues has identified
a number of processes that reduce the likelihood of such
informal contacts taking place between classes. The
most important take place in the spheres of housing,
basic services and travel, shopping and recreation.
In the first of these spheres, residential segregation
leads to people with similar socio-economic levels
being concentrated in the same neighbourhoods. The
extreme manifestations of this segregation are rich
ghettos and poor ghettos. Large Latin American cities
now contain neighbourhoods inhabited by middle-
income sectors with homogeneous characteristics. The
spatial polarization of social classes in cities is being
compounded by the appearance of what are known as
“fortified enclaves”, housing estates that are insulated
from their immediate geographical environment by
physical barriers and sophisticated security
technologies; at the same time, some poor ghettos also
erect barriers against representatives of the society that
operates outside their borders. Although these processes
are at an embryonic stage in Uruguay, a recent study
shows that between 1985 and 1995 the social
composition of individual neighbourhoods became
more homogeneous, which meant that heterogeneity
between neighbourhoods also increased.
In the second, the segmentation of basic services
is another of the factors that undermine a country’s
reserve of solidarity. Because of its crucial importance
in enabling people to take advantage of opportunities
for social mobility, educational segmentation has
received particular attention. When middle-income
sectors abandon State schooling, this is deprived of a
“voice” in the struggle to maintain its quality, while at
the same time these sectors lose the incentive to pay
high taxes for this purpose.22 In addition, though, this
deprives poorer children of contacts that help inculcate
middle-class attitudes and aspirations (for example, the
belief that efforts to learn are rewarded by achievement
and that it is therefore worthwhile to defer immediate
gratifications and invest in the long-term accumulation of
human resources). In recent years, there has been an
incipient movement towards educational segmentation in
Montevideo (but not in the urban interior of the country),
with a growing proportion of children and young people
from the highest income deciles now attending private
establishments, while the great majority go to free State
establishments (Kaztman, 1997); fortunately, these
tendencies are being counteracted by an ambitious
educational reform designed to improve the coverage and
quality of public-sector schooling. Similar considerations
could be adduced in respect of the segmentation of other
basic services, such as health care and, more recently,
public security.23
Places of transit, shopping and recreation and
leisure are the third area of informal contacts between
the classes which could be affected by middle-class
abandonment. These include places as diverse as bars,
small neighbourhood shops, beaches and popular
entertainments such as football and carnivals.
By distinguishing between these three spheres, the
aim is to highlight the variety of paths whereby multi-
class sociability can be promoted and the powerful
tendencies towards privatization and the isolation of
the classes can be counteracted.
When the processes of segregation and
segmentation come together in the three areas referred
to, there are sections of society that begin to be pushed,
without their wishing it, to the margins of the sectors
that represent the mainstream of society. This isolation
encourages the consolidation of marginal subcultures,
social exclusion and mechanisms that perpetuate
poverty between the generations.
Because the urban spaces where the different
classes meet together in an informal way are declining
so slowly, the consequences of this for social integra-
tion generally pass unnoticed by most citizens. As a
result, these spaces are usually undervalued as factors
of integration and as sources of renewal for a country’s
22
 As Barry argues, approval of high taxes makes it possible to
improve the quality of collective services while reducing the re-
sources available for higher-income groups to invest in private ser-
vices, all of which discourages abandonment of public services
(Barry, 1998, p. 23).
23
 The motor car, perhaps the paramount symbol of social mobil-
ity, is increasingly distancing the middle classes from the hazards
and adversities of public transport and the informal sociability that
its use tends to encourage.
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reserves of altruism, solidarity and aversion to inequal-
ity. The effects of this decline, however, will come out
sooner or later, sometime in a violent, anomic and un-
expected way, through the socially disruptive correlates
of a poverty that is marginalized by the concentration
of want and by progressive isolation from the main-
stream of society. The response of the middle classes is
to distance themselves from the public places and ser-
vices used by the “dangerous classes”, whose modes
of behaviour, developed in isolation amid general want,
are viewed by the other classes as exotic and alien. The
desertion of the middle classes merely highlights the
decline of public spaces, which narrows the field of
experiences capable of stimulating the capacity to em-
pathize with less well-off sectors and the feeling of
having a moral obligation towards them, thus raising
the threshold of tolerance for inequality.
The objective of strengthening social integration
in the cities by promoting public spaces where the
different classes can come together may appear to lie
outside the capabilities of State policies, partly because
the resources that would have to be employed might be
required for other priorities on the social agenda linked
to poverty relief. Certainly, this perception would be
correct in many of the region’s major cities, where
residential segregation, segmentation of services and
the abandonment by the middle classes of public spaces
in which informal contact can take place between the
classes have reached such an advanced stage that the
idea of halting or reversing them in the short or medium
term seems to be completely unrealistic. This is not the
case, however, in Uruguay, where these processes are
incipient and the great bulk of society does not seem
willing to allow public goods to deteriorate, especially
if people come to realize that such a deterioration also
entails the weakening of a heritage of social justice and
democracy which is taken for granted as a major feature
of national identity.
Besides, many social integration initiatives have been
undertaken in the cities of North America and Europe
–either specifically for this purpose or as part of sectoral
policies– entailing urban management measures, the
selection of beneficiaries for subsidized housing projects,
measures to preserve the quality of public services and
the promotion of urban spaces which encourage informal
contacts between the classes. Out of the wide range of
urban social integration initiatives which have proved to
be successful, advantage can be taken of those which are
best suited to the resources and the special characteristics
of Uruguayan society.
Bibliography
Altimir, O. (1997): Desigualdad, empleo y pobreza en
América Latina: efectos del ajuste y del cambio en el
estilo de desarrollo, Desarrollo económico, vol. 37,
No. 145, Buenos Aires, Institute of Economic and So-
cial Development (IDES).
Barry, B. (1998): Social Exclusion, Social Isolation and Dis-
tribution of Income, Case paper, No. 12, London, Lon-
don School of Economics.
Basañez, M., M. Lagos and T. Beltrán (1996): Reporte 1995:
encuesta Latinobarómetro, Santiago, Chile, mimeo.
Bucheli, M. and M. Furtado (in the press): La contribución
de las distintas fuentes de ingreso a la evolución de la
desigualdad en el Uruguay urbano 1986-1997 ,
Montevideo, ECLAC office in Montevideo.
(2000): La evolución de la participación de las
fuentes de ingreso en Uruguay (1986-1997), paper pre-
sented at Seminario de Economía Social, Montevideo,
University of the Republic, Department of Economics,
March.
Bucheli, M. and M. Rossi (1994): La distribución del ingreso
en Uruguay 1984-1992, Document No. 10, Montevideo,
University of the Republic, Department of Economics.
Bucheli, M. (1997): Equidad en la asignaciones familiares
de Uruguay, Montevideo, ECLAC office in Montevideo .
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean) (1998): Social Panorama of Latin America,
1997, Santiago, Chile.
(1999): Social Panorama of Latin America, 1998,
Santiago, Chile.
Filgueira, F. and J.A. Moraes (1999): Political Environments,
Sector Specific Configurations and Strategic Devices:
Understanding Institutional Reform in Uruguay, IDB
Working Paper series, No. R-351, Washington, D.C.,
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Filgueira, F. and J. Papadópulos (1997): Putting conserva-
tism to good use? Long crisis and vetoed alternatives in
Uruguay, D.A. Chalmers and others (eds.), The New
Politics of Inequality in Latin America, Oxford, U.K.,
Oxford University Press.
Filgueira, C. and F. Filgueira (1998): Taming market reform:
The politics of social state reform in Uruguay,
Montevideo, mimeo.
Filgueira, C. (1999): Vulnerabilidad, activos y recursos de
los hogares: una exploración de indicadores, R. Kaztman
(coord.), Activos y estructuras de oportunidades:
estudios sobre las raíces de la vulnerabilidad social en
Uruguay, Montevideo, ECLAC office in Montevideo.
Foster, J. and A. Sen (1997): On Economic Inequality after
a Quarter Century, Oxford, U.K., Clarendon Press.
Hirschman, A.O. (1970): Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses
97C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 2  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 0
NEW CHALLENGES FOR EQUITY IN  URUGUAY  •  RUBEN KAZTMAN, FERNANDO F ILGUEIRA AND MAG DALENA FURTADO
to Decline in Firms, Organization and States, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) (1997): Latin
America after a decade of reforms, Economic and
Social Progress 1997 Report, Washington, D.C.
(1998): América Latina frente a la desigualdad,
Progreso económico y social en América Latina.
Informe 1998-1999, Washington, D.C.
Instituto Nacional de la Familia y de la Mujer (in the press):
Mujer y estadísticas, Montevideo.
Jenkins, A. (1995): Accounting for inequality trends: De-
composition for the UK, 1971-1986, Economica, No. 62.
Kaztman, R. (1997): Marginality and social integration in
Uruguay, CEPAL Review, No. 62, LC/G.1969-P, Santiago,
Chile, ECLAC.
Kaztman, R. and P. Gerstenfeld (1980): The complexity of
evaluating social development, CEPAL Review, No. 41,
LC/G.1631-P, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC.
Li, H., L. Squire and H.F. Zou (1998): Explaining interna-
tional and intertemporal variations in income inequal-
ity, The Economic Journal, vol. 108, No. 446, Oxford,
U.K., Blackwell Publishers.
Machado A. and I. Reggio (1999): Incidencia de la reforma
en el mecanismo de ajuste de las pasividades de 1990
sobre la distribución del ingreso de los hogares. Uru-
guay: 1986-1997, Montevideo, University of the Re-
public, monograph for Economics degree.
O’Donnell, G. (1993): On the State, Democratization and
Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with
Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries, Indiana,
University of Notre Dame.
President of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Office of  Plan-
ning and the Budget (1999): Datos económicos y
sociales del Uruguay, Montevideo.
Paci, M. (1998): Il welfare state come problema di egemonia,
Stato e mercato, No. 22, Rome.
Shorrocks, A. (1982): Inequality decomposition by factor
components, Econometrica, vol. 50, Evanston, Illinois,
Econometric Society.
(1983): The impact of income components on the distri-
bution of family income, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 98, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University.
UNCTAD/ECLAC (1998): Política comercial a nivel país y los
acuerdos de la Ronda Uruguay, Montevideo, January,
mimeo.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Office in
Uruguay (in the press): Informe de desarrollo humano
de Uruguay, Montevideo.
Vigorito, A. (1997): Una distribución del ingreso estable. El
caso de Uruguay 1986-1997, Montevideo, University
of the Republic, Institute of Economics.
(1999): La distribución del ingreso en Uruguay en-
tre 1986 y 1997, Revista de economía, vol. 6, No. 2,
Montevideo, Central Bank.
